A two-player iterated survival game

DOI10.1016/j.tpb.2018.12.001zbMath1406.91028OpenAlexW2950712039MaRDI QIDQ1714234

John Wakeley, Martin A. Nowak

Publication date: 31 January 2019

Published in: Theoretical Population Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tpb.2018.12.001

zbMATH Keywords

prisoner's dilemmareplicator equationMoran modeliterated gamesurvival game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) 2-person games (91A05) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items

The consequences of switching strategies in a two-player iterated survival game ⋮ Survivor's dilemma: the evolution of cooperation in volatile environments ⋮ Best reply player against mixed evolutionarily stable strategy user

Uses Software

• Mathematica

Cites Work

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