Strategic manipulation in Bayesian dialogues

DOI10.1007/S11229-021-03288-0MaRDI QIDQ6187775zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date 1 February 2024

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03288-0

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecommon beliefconvergence of beliefsBayesian implicatures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01) Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 795590 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3080510 (Why is no real title available?)
• Agreeing to disagree
• Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
• Normal Bayesian Dialogues
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Probability with Martingales
• Reaching a Consensus
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• We can't disagree forever

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