Strategic manipulation in Bayesian dialogues

DOI10.1007/s11229-021-03288-0zbMath1529.62046OpenAlexW3184293639MaRDI QIDQ6187775

Christina Pawlowitsch

Publication date: 1 February 2024

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-021-03288-0

zbMATH Keywords

common knowledgecommon beliefconvergence of beliefsBayesian implicatures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Bayesian problems; characterization of Bayes procedures (62C10) Foundations and philosophical topics in statistics (62A01)

Cites Work

• Common knowledge, communication, and convergence of beliefs
• We can't disagree forever
• Reexamination of the perfectness concept for equilibrium points in extensive games
• Agreeing to disagree
• Normal Bayesian Dialogues
• Probability with Martingales
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Reaching a Consensus
• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item

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