The market for conservation and other hostages

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.003zbMath1371.91065OpenAlexW3122630299MaRDI QIDQ337792

Bård Harstad

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamestime inconsistencydeforestationconservationmarket failuresales v rental markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Related Items (2)

The market for conservation and other hostages ⋮ Pledge-and-review in the laboratory

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Stationary Markov Equilibria
• Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
• Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions

This page was built for publication: The market for conservation and other hostages