The market for conservation and other hostages

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.003MaRDI QIDQ337792zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Bård Harstad

Publication date 3 November 2016

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Copyright license Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

conservationdeforestationdynamic gamesmarket failuresales v rental marketstime inconsistency

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76)

Recommendations

• Conservation contracts and political regimes
• Efficiency of conservationist measures: an optimist viewpoint.
• When the truth hurts: Endangered species policy on private land with imperfect information
• INTERNATIONAL BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
• Material interests, moral reputation, and crowding out species protection on private land

Cites work

• A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists
• Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
• Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
• Confining the Coase theorem: contracting, ownership, and free-riding
• Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
• Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
• Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1323215 (Why is no real title available?)
• Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
• Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
• Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights
• Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
• Stationary Markov Equilibria
• The market for conservation and other hostages

Cited in

(7)

• When the truth hurts: Endangered species policy on private land with imperfect information
• Pledge-and-review in the laboratory
• The market for conservation and other hostages
• INTERNATIONAL BIODIVERSITY CONSERVATION AGREEMENTS
• Conservation contracts and political regimes
• Restoring the commons: optimizing the restoration of natural assets
• Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection

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