The market for conservation and other hostages

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003zbMath1371.91065MaRDI QIDQ337792

Bård Harstad

Publication date: 3 November 2016

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic games; time inconsistency; deforestation; conservation; market failure; sales v rental markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

91B24: Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets)

91B76: Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.)

91A20: Multistage and repeated games

Related Items

The market for conservation and other hostages, Pledge-and-review in the laboratory

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