The market for conservation and other hostages
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Publication:337792
DOI10.1016/J.JET.2016.07.003zbMATH Open1371.91065OpenAlexW3122630299MaRDI QIDQ337792FDOQ337792
Authors: Bård Harstad 
Publication date: 3 November 2016
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2016.07.003
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Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24)
Cites Work
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Renegotiation in repeated games
- Markov perfect equilibrium. I: Observable actions
- Asymmetric Information Bargaining Problems with Many Agents
- Stationary Markov Equilibria
- Collective dynamic consistency in repeated games
- Stationary equilibria in bargaining with externalities
- Extending renegotiation-proofness to infinite horizon games
- Renegotiation and symmetry in repeated games
- A reconsideration of the problem of social cost: Free riders and monopolists
- The market for conservation and other hostages
- Contract Renegotiation and Coasian Dynamics
- Confining the Coase Theorem: Contracting, Ownership, and Free-Riding
- Negative Externalities May Cause Delay in Negotiation
- Cyclical Delay in Bargaining with Externalities
- Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights
Cited In (4)
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