Voluntary incentive design for endangered species protection
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Publication:697498
DOI10.1006/JEEM.2000.1183zbMATH Open1050.91528OpenAlexW2056551470MaRDI QIDQ697498FDOQ697498
Authors: Rodney B. W. Smith, Jason F. Shogren
Publication date: 17 September 2002
Published in: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1006/jeem.2000.1183
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