Choice correspondences for public goods
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Publication:2567904
DOI10.1007/S355-002-8329-7zbMATH Open1072.91546OpenAlexW2032907445MaRDI QIDQ2567904FDOQ2567904
Authors: Bettina Klaus, Ton Storcken
Publication date: 14 October 2005
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://cris.maastrichtuniversity.nl/ws/files/1684666/guid-430bbd5d-e74f-4d00-a9cf-ac449ba07d6d-ASSET1.0.pdf
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- On strategy-proofness and single-peakedness: median-voting over intervals
- Strategic manipulations of multi-valued solutions in economies with indivisibilities
- Independence axioms for the provision of multiple public goods as options
- On the manipulation of social choice correspondences
- Condorcet winners for public goods
- Social Preferences and the Provision of Public Goods
- Multiple public goods, lexicographic preferences, and single-plateaued preference rules.
- Strategy-proof interval-social choice correspondences over extended single-peaked domains
- Multiple public goods and lexicographic preferences: Replacement principle
- Public goods, participation constraints, and democracy: a possibility theorem
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