Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1MaRDI QIDQ1101022zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Tatsuro Ichiishi

Publication date 1987

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1

zbMATH Keywords

compact metric spacerepeated gamenonemptinessrandomized strategiesone-shot game\(\beta \)- corecorrelated strategiesstrong equilibrium utility allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Recommendations

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139273 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3827624 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3176450 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3759941 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3777289 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3245885 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3274494 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Cores in noncooperative games
• Refinements of the -core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom

Cited in

(7)

• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Game with Repeated Decisions
• ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
• Strong Parallel Repetition Theorem for Free Projection Games
• Refinements of the -core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5309894 (Why is no real title available?)
• Core-like solutions for games with probabilistic choice of strategies

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