Strong equilibria of a repeated game with randomized strategies

DOI10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1zbMATH Open0641.90097OpenAlexW2129067307MaRDI QIDQ1101022FDOQ1101022

Authors: Tatsuro Ichiishi 

Publication date: 1987

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(87)90001-1

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zbMATH Keywords

compact metric spacerepeated gamenonemptinessrandomized strategiesone-shot game\(\beta \)- corecorrelated strategiesstrong equilibrium utility allocations

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

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• Utility Theory without the Completeness Axiom
• Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies
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• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• A Social Coalitional Equilibrium Existence Lemma
• Cores in noncooperative games
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Cited In (7)

• Randomized strategy equilibrium in the action commitment game with costs of leading
• Game with Repeated Decisions
• ``Subjectivity and correlation in randomized strategies: back to the roots
• Strong Parallel Repetition Theorem for Free Projection Games
• Refinements of the \(\beta\)-core and the strong equilibrium and the Aumann proposition
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Core-like solutions for games with probabilistic choice of strategies

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