Coalitions, leadership, and social norms: The power of suggestion in games
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Publication:1187866
DOI10.1016/0899-8256(92)90006-EzbMath0760.90099OpenAlexW2093840504MaRDI QIDQ1187866
Publication date: 3 August 1992
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/0899-8256(92)90006-e
Related Items (3)
Influence functions, followers and command games ⋮ Different Approaches to Influence Based on Social Networks and Simple Games ⋮ The grand surplus value and repeated cooperative cross-games with coalitional collaboration
Cites Work
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- An application of the theory of social situations to repeated games
- Finitely Repeated Games
- On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
- The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
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