Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2015.04.009zbMath1331.91032OpenAlexW208824066MaRDI QIDQ898765

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10810/13447

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Dynamic programming and stochastic control
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Demons and repentance
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame
• Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting

This page was built for publication: Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games