Simple coalitional strategy profiles in repeated games

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2015.04.009zbMATH Open1331.91032OpenAlexW208824066MaRDI QIDQ898765FDOQ898765

N. E. Zubov

Publication date: 18 December 2015

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10810/13447

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Cites Work

• Coalition-proof Nash equilibria. I: Concepts
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Dynamic programming and stochastic control
• Renegotiation in repeated games
• On the Theory of Infinitely Repeated Games with Discounting
• Extremal equlibria of oligopolistic supergames
• Strong perfect equilibrium in supergames
• Renegotiation in the repeated Cournot model
• Demons and repentance
• The approximation of a strong perfect equilibrium in a discounted supergame

Cited In (1)

• COALITION BARGAINING IN REPEATED GAMES

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