Time consistent cooperative solutions for multistage games with vector payoffs
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Publication:1728229
DOI10.1016/j.orl.2017.04.004zbMath1409.91030OpenAlexW2603852555MaRDI QIDQ1728229
Mariya Nikitina, D. V. Kuzyutin
Publication date: 22 February 2019
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2017.04.004
Cooperative games (91A12) Differential games (aspects of game theory) (91A23) Games in extensive form (91A18)
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