Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure

DOI10.1007/s40505-023-00242-wzbMath1520.91041OpenAlexW4323665566MaRDI QIDQ6164123

Ken Urai, Hiromi Murakami, Weiye Chen

Publication date: 27 July 2023

Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/repo/ouka/all/76188/oep70_1_018.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

coalition production economyfirm formationsocial coalitional equilibriumindustrial organization structuremulti-layered coalition structures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Cooperative games (91A12)

Cites Work

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