Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure
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Publication:6164123
DOI10.1007/s40505-023-00242-wzbMath1520.91041OpenAlexW4323665566MaRDI QIDQ6164123
Ken Urai, Hiromi Murakami, Weiye Chen
Publication date: 27 July 2023
Published in: Economic Theory Bulletin (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ir.library.osaka-u.ac.jp/repo/ouka/all/76188/oep70_1_018.pdf
coalition production economyfirm formationsocial coalitional equilibriumindustrial organization structuremulti-layered coalition structures
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