Predictive superiority of the beta-characteristic function in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games

DOI10.1007/BF00127190MaRDI QIDQ1084346zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors H. Andrew Michener, James M. Ekman, David C. Dettman

Publication date 1986

Published in Theory and Decision (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00127190

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative non-sidepayment gamescoredecision-makingexperimental studyimputation setpayoff predictionsstable set

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Mathematical sociology (including anthropology) (91D99) Mathematical psychology (91E99)

Review text

This article reports an experimental study of decision-making outcomes in cooperative non-sidepayment games. The objective of this test was to determine which characteristic function, \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) or \(V_{\beta}(S)\), provides the most accurate basis for payoff predictions from solution concepts. The experiment tested three solution concepts (core, stable set, imputation set) in the context of 5-person, 2-strategy non-sidepayment games. Predictions from each of the three solution concepts were computed on the basis of both \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) and \(V_{\beta}(S)\), making a total of six predictive theories under test. Consistent with earlier studies [\textit{H. A. Michener, D. C. Dettman} and \textit{Y. C. Choi}, in: Advances in Group Processes 1, JAI Press, Greenwich, CT (1984); \textit{H. A. Michener, D. C. Dettman, J. M. Ekman} and \textit{Y. C. Choi}, A comparison of the alpha- and beta characteristic functions in cooperative non-sidepayment n-person games, Techn. Report, Dept. of Sociology, Univ. of Wisconsin at Madison (1985)], two basic findings emerged. First, the data show that for each of the solutions tested, the prediction from any solution concept computed from \(V_{\beta}(S)\) was more accurate than the prediction from the same solution concept computed from \(V_{\alpha}(S)\). Second, the \(\beta\)- core was the most accurate of the six theories tested. Overall, these results support the view that \(V_{\beta}(S)\) is superior to \(V_{\alpha}(S)\) as a basis for payoff predictions in cooperative non- sidepayment games.

Recommendations

• A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games¹
• A test of the characteristic function and the Harsanyi function in N- person normal form sidepayment games
• Comparative accuracy of value solutions in non-sidepayment games with empty core
• A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3914121

Cites work

• A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games¹
• A test of the core solution in finite strategy non-sidepayment games
• Bargaining sets of cooperative games without side payments
• Endogenous Formation of Coalitions
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3644353 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3867093 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 1194806 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3207762 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3106184 (Why is no real title available?)
• The Core of a Cooperative Game Without Side Payments
• The Core of an N Person Game
• Von Neumann-Morgenstern solutions to cooperative games without side payments

Cited in

(1)

• A comparison of the alpha‐ and beta‐characteristic functions in cooperative non‐sidepayment n‐person games¹

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