Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules (Q2500719)

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scientific article

Language	Label	Description	Also known as
English	Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules	scientific article

Statements

scholarly article

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Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules (English)

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M. Remzi Sanver

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Social Choice and Welfare

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publication date

18 August 2006

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MaRDI profile type

MaRDI publication profile

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full work available at URL

https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-005-0058-y

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Stable voting schemes

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Implementability via protective equilibria

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General, direct and self-implementation of social choice functions via protective equilibria

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Nash implementation of matching rules

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Nash Equilibrium and Welfare Optimality

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Consistency of decision processes

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Geometry of voting

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Scoring rules cannot respect majority in choice and elimination simultaneously

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The implementation of social choice functions via social choice correspondences: A general formulation and a limit result

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Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate

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A note on scoring rules that respect majority in choice and elimination.

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Identifiers

zbMATH Open document ID

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10.1007/s00355-005-0058-y

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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zbMATH DE Number

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Sitelinks

Mathematics(1 entry)

mardi Publication:2500719

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