Stable voting schemes

DOI10.1016/0022-0531(80)90011-3MaRDI QIDQ1153026zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Salvador Barberà

Publication date 1980

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(80)90011-3

zbMATH Keywords

approval votingcounterthreatmanipulationpreference misrepresentationprotective stabilitystable voting schemesthreatvoting by veto

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

Cites work

• Counter-threats and Strategic Manipulation under Voting Schemes
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3724161 (Why is no real title available?)
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(4)

• Salvador Barberà
• Minimal monotonic extensions of scoring rules
• Is it ever safe to vote strategically?
• Implementability via protective equilibria

This page was built for publication: Stable voting schemes

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1153026)