Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions

DOI10.5402/2012/459459zbMath1235.91012OpenAlexW1966954916WikidataQ58690475 ScholiaQ58690475MaRDI QIDQ408489

Yasuhito Tanaka

Publication date: 10 April 2012

Published in: ISRN Computational Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.5402/2012/459459

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10)

Related Items

Brouwer's fixed point theorem with isolated fixed points and his fan theorem, ASYMPTOTIC BEHAVIOR OF THE SOLUTIONS OF DIFFERENCE EQUATION SYSTEM OF EXPONENTIAL FORM

Cites Work

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