Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions (Q408489)

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scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6022653
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    Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions
    scientific article; zbMATH DE number 6022653

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      Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions (English)
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      10 April 2012
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      Summary: We constructively prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions. The proof is based on the existence of approximate Nash equilibria which is proved by Sperner's lemma. We follow the Bishop-style constructive mathematics.
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