Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games (Q2284206)

The authors propose a new approach to the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite-stage repeated games (see e.g. [\textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{M. B. Maschler}, Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1995; Zbl 0972.91501)]). Instead of the well-known folk theorems in which punishment strategies are involved in the case if one of the players deviates from the agreed-upon behavior, deviation of a coalition of the players is admissible. Moreover the proposed punishment strategy does not require the full information about the deviating coalition but uses any information about the deviation of a single player. It leads to special condition for a strong Nash equilibrium under some additional constraints on the structure of associated zero-sum games in each stage of the main repeated game.