Construction of a strong Nash equilibrium in a class of infinite nonzero-sum games

DOI10.1134/S008154381904014XMaRDI QIDQ2284206zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Yaroslavna B. Pankratova, Leon A. Petrosyan

Publication date 14 January 2020

Published in Proceedings of the Steklov Institute of Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1134/s008154381904014x

zbMATH Keywords

folk theoreminfinite multistage gamespunishment strategiesstrong Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

(n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06) Noncooperative games (91A10) Multistage and repeated games (91A20)

Review text

The authors propose a new approach to the existence of Nash equilibria in infinite-stage repeated games (see e.g. [\textit{R. J. Aumann} and \textit{M. B. Maschler}, Repeated games with incomplete information. With the collaboration of Richard E. Stearns. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press (1995; Zbl 0972.91501)]). Instead of the well-known folk theorems in which punishment strategies are involved in the case if one of the players deviates from the agreed-upon behavior, deviation of a coalition of the players is admissible. Moreover the proposed punishment strategy does not require the full information about the deviating coalition but uses any information about the deviation of a single player. It leads to special condition for a strong Nash equilibrium under some additional constraints on the structure of associated zero-sum games in each stage of the main repeated game.

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Cites work

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Cited in

(4)

• Infinite Player Noncooperative Games and the Continuity of the Nash Equilibrium Correspondence
• Constructive proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium in a finite strategic game with sequentially locally nonconstant payoff functions
• STRONG NASH EQUILIBRIUM IN MULTISTAGE GAMES
• On the 85th anniversary of L. A. Petrosyan

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