Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game?
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Publication:820567
DOI10.1016/j.tcs.2021.07.020MaRDI QIDQ820567
Zheng Chen, Yuexuan Wang, Zhaoquan Gu
Publication date: 27 September 2021
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.07.020
68Qxx: Theory of computing
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