Which is the fairest allocation in the max-min fairness-based coalitional game?
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Publication:820567
DOI10.1016/J.TCS.2021.07.020OpenAlexW3184401543MaRDI QIDQ820567FDOQ820567
Authors: Zheng Chen, Zhaoquan Gu, Yuexuan Wang
Publication date: 27 September 2021
Published in: Theoretical Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2021.07.020
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