Reaching a consensus

DOI10.1007/s00355-007-0247-yzbMath1180.91076OpenAlexW2087875017MaRDI QIDQ2464042

Richard Bradley

Publication date: 10 December 2007

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-007-0247-y

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06)

Related Items

SUPPORT FOR GEOMETRIC POOLING ⋮ Testimony as evidence: more problems for linear pooling ⋮ Learning from others: conditioning versus averaging ⋮ A pragmatic argument against equal weighting

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