Two criteria for social decisions
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4091137 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670137 (Why is no real title available?)
- A strong incompatibility between efficiency and equity in non-convex economies
- A study of choice correspondences in economies with a variable number of agents
- Arrovian aggregation in economic environments: how much should we know about indifference surfaces?
- Efficiency first or equity first? Two principles and rationality of social choice
- Egalitarian-equivalence and the Pareto principle for social preferences
- Fair Income Tax
- Fair Production and Allocation of an Excludable Nonrival Good
- Fair social orderings
- Fair social orderings when agents have unequal production skills
- On the informational basis of social choice
- Pazner-Schmeidler rules in large societies
- Social choice and individual values
- The Pazner-Schmeidler social ordering: a defense
- The impossibility of a Paretian egalitarian
- The independence condition in the theory of social choice
- The informational basis of the theory of fair allocation
- The news of the death of welfare economics is greatly exaggerated
- Welfare egalitarianism in non-rival environments
Cited in
(8)- Resource egalitarianism with a dash of efficiency
- An axiomatic approach to the measurement of envy
- Opportunity analysis of newborn screening programs
- Criteria to compare mechanisms that partially satisfy a property: an axiomatic study
- Moral efficiency. A new criterion for social choice
- Welfare egalitarianism with other-regarding preferences
- The Pareto principle and resource egalitarianism
- Haves and have-nots: a theory of economic sufficientarianism
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