An axiomatic characterization of split cycle
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3139280 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
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- Twitching weak dictators
- Uncovered sets
- Voting and group decision functions
- Voting theory in the Lean theorem prover
- Weighted tournament solutions
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