An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111589MaRDI QIDQ6498749zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Wesley H. Holliday

Publication date 7 May 2024

Published in Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/J.ECONLET.2024.111589

zbMATH Keywords

Condorcet loserCondorcet winnerimpossibility theorempositive involvementresolvabilitysocial choice theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• A dynamical model of political equilibrium
• A majority-rule characterization with multiple extensions
• A new monotonic, clone-independent, reversal symmetric, and condorcet-consistent single-winner election method
• Aggregation of Preferences with Variable Electorate
• An analysis of random elections with large numbers of voters
• Basic Geometry of Voting
• Choosing from a weighted tournament
• Comparison functions and choice correspondences
• Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
• Condorcet consistency and the strong no show paradoxes
• Condorcet Social Choice Functions
• Condorcet's principle and the strong no-show paradoxes
• Extending Condorcet's rule
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3148878 (Why is no real title available?)
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
• Independence of clones as a criterion for voting rules
• On the acceptability of arguments and its fundamental role in nonmonotonic reasoning, logic programming and n-person games
• Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
• The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
• The supercovering relation, the pairwise winner, and more missing links between Borda and Condorcet
• Uncovered sets
• Weighted tournament solutions

Cited in

(6)

• Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
• Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
• An axiomatic characterization of split cycle
• The negative participation paradox in three-candidate instant runoff elections
• An extension of May's theorem to three alternatives: axiomatizing Minimax voting
• The incompatibility of the Condorcet winner and loser criteria with positive involvement and resolvability

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