Condorcet-consistent choice among three candidates
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Cites work
- A Consistent Extension of Condorcet’s Election Principle
- A Set of Independent Necessary and Sufficient Conditions for Simple Majority Decision
- An extension of the Moulin no show paradox for voting correspondences
- An impossibility theorem concerning positive involvement in voting
- Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?
- Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption
- Choosers as extension axioms
- Concorcet's principle implies the no show paradox
- Condorcet Social Choice Functions
- Condorcet's paradox
- Discrete Mathematics in Voting and Group Choice
- Dogson's rule and Yong's rule
- How frequently do different voting rules encounter voting paradoxes in three-candidate elections?
- How many voters are needed for paradoxes?
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3646588 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4005933 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3692946 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 44383 (Why is no real title available?)
- Introduction to the theory of voting
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Measuring violations of positive involvement in voting
- On Ehrhart polynomials and probability calculations in voting theory
- Optimal bounds for the no-show paradox via SAT solving
- Probability calculations under the IAC hypothesis
- Social Choice Scoring Functions
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Strategyproof social choice when preferences and outcomes may contain ties
- The Manipulation of Social Choice Mechanisms that Do Not Leave "Too Much" to Chance
- The strong no show paradoxes are a common flaw in Condorcet voting correspondences
- Tournament solutions and majority voting
- Uncovered sets
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