``The liberal paradox: A generalization by D. Kelsey
``The liberal paradox: A generalization'' by D. Kelsey (scientific article; zbMATH DE number 4045431)
This paper examines a particular sort of social decision process. It examines those processes which ackowledge rights as a matter of electoral process. But it also examines a subclass of such voting schemes. In particular it requires that no matter how votes are cast, and no matter how votes are allocated: (1) Unanimity should always be respected; (2) the voting procedure should deliver a choice set. (It is the second of those requirements that generates impossibility results.) The precise focus of this paper is on rights and unanimous judgements which may be brought about by strategic misrepresentation. Thus I may be able to exercise a right over two alternatives, x and y, but the exercise may be a result of a strategic misrepresentation. The paper considers whether the strategic burden thus imposed an voters, ensures that a choice set is always generated by the voting system. In fact for 3 alternatives, any of the preferences in Sen rights cases [see \textit{A. K. Sen}, ``Collective choice and social welfare (1970; Zbl 0227.90011)] can accommodate these strategic expressions. It follows that Sen's paradox holds under ``non-imposition.
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