Regulating competing coalitions: a logic for socially optimal group choices

DOI10.1080/11663081.2012.682787zbMATH Open1398.03155OpenAlexW2038996852MaRDI QIDQ4583152FDOQ4583152

Authors: Paolo Turrini, Rosja Mastop, Jan Broersen, John-Jules Meyer 

Publication date: 28 August 2018

Published in: Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2012.682787

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zbMATH Keywords

deontic logiccoalition logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Cites Work

• Social choice and individual values
• Everything else being equal: a modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences
• Moral conflicts between groups of agents
• A course in game theory.
• Agency and deontic logic
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• A different approach to deontic logic: Deontic logic viewed as a variant of dynamic logic
• An Update Operator for Strategic Ability

Cited In (3)

• A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms
• On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.
• Forbidding undesirable agreements: a dependence-based approach to the regulation of multi-agent systems

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