Regulating competing coalitions: a logic for socially optimal group choices

DOI10.1080/11663081.2012.682787MaRDI QIDQ4583152zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Paolo Turrini, Rosja Mastop, Jan Broersen, John-Jules Meyer

Publication date 28 August 2018

Published in Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1080/11663081.2012.682787

zbMATH Keywords

deontic logiccoalition logic

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Group preferences (91B10) Social choice (91B14) Modal logic (including the logic of norms) (03B45) Other applications of logic (03B80)

Recommendations

• A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms
• Forbidding undesirable agreements: a dependence-based approach to the regulation of multi-agent systems
• Coalition formation in social environments with logic-based agents1
• Reasoning about cooperation, actions and preferences
• Forbidding undesirable agreements

Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3670430 (Why is no real title available?)
• A course in game theory.
• A different approach to deontic logic: Deontic logic viewed as a variant of dynamic logic
• A note on the extension of an order on a set to the power set
• Agency and deontic logic
• An Update Operator for Strategic Ability
• Effectivity functions, game forms, games, and rights
• Everything else being equal: a modal logic for ceteris paribus preferences
• Moral conflicts between groups of agents
• Social choice and individual values

Cited in

(3)

• A Deontic Logic for Socially Optimal Norms
• On consistent coalitions in group decision making with flexible decision makers.
• Forbidding undesirable agreements: a dependence-based approach to the regulation of multi-agent systems

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