Learning in crowded markets

DOI10.1016/J.JET.2019.08.006MaRDI QIDQ2334124zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Péter Kondor, A. G. Zawadowski

Publication date 7 November 2019

Published in Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://economicdynamics.org/meetpapers/2016/paper_338.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

inattentioncrowded markets

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Microeconomic theory (price theory and economic markets) (91B24) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Recommendations

• Information acquisition, price informativeness, and welfare
• Learning from others: A welfare analysis
• Learning and Capacity Expansion under Demand Uncertainty
• Information Acquisition and Relative Efficiency of Competitive, Oligopoly and Monopoly Markets
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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 2061729 (Why is no real title available?)
• A rational theory of mutual funds' attention allocation
• Bubbles and Crashes
• Coordination with flexible information acquisition
• Endogenous Information Acquisition in Coordination Games
• Information Acquisition and Welfare
• Knowing What Others Know: Coordination Motives in Information Acquisition
• Learning in crowded markets
• Market Structure and Innovation
• Optimality of debt under flexible information acquisition
• The bubble game: an experimental study of speculation

Cited in

(5)

• Learning-by-doing may not be enough to sustain competitiveness in a market
• Learning competitive market balance
• Discussion: Making Progress in a Crowded Market
• Learning in crowded markets
• Market selection with learning and catching up with the Joneses

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