An experimental study of decentralized matching
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Cites work
- An experimental study of decentralized matching
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Clearinghouses for two-sided matching: an experimental study
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Decentralized job matching
- Deferred acceptance with compensation chains
- Equilibrium selection and the role of information in repeated matching markets
- Expectations and fairness in a simple bargaining experiment
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 45086 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3558960 (Why is no real title available?)
- Incentives in decentralized random matching markets
- Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
- Random Paths to Stability in Two-Sided Matching
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
- The Complexity of Counting Stable Marriages
- The Dynamics of Reorganization in Matching Markets: A Laboratory Experiment Motivated by A Natural Experiments*
- The Generalized Median Stable Matchings: Finding Them Is Not That Easy
- The geometry of fractional stable matchings and its applications
- Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
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