Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
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Publication:732930
DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.02.003zbMATH Open1193.91050OpenAlexW2075253156MaRDI QIDQ732930FDOQ732930
Authors: Michael K. Miller 
Publication date: 15 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003
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Cites Work
- Social choice and individual values
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
- A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem
- Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
Cited In (10)
- Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
- Do we really need numerous observations to select candidates? (The \(d\)-day theorem)
- Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories
- A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
- Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
- Weak independence and the Pareto principle
- A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
- A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice
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