Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach

DOI10.1016/J.MATHSOCSCI.2009.02.003MaRDI QIDQ732930zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Michael K. Miller

Publication date 15 October 2009

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003

zbMATH Keywords

social choice theoryArrow's theorempivotal voterspreference aggregation theoryWilson's theorem

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3637541 (Why is no real title available?)
• A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem
• An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
• Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
• Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems
• Social choice and individual values
• Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
• Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
• The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
• Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
• t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off

Cited in

(10)

• Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis
• Do we really need numerous observations to select candidates? (The \(d\)-day theorem)
• Social choice and information: the informational structure of uniqueness theorems in axiomatic social theories
• A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle
• Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
• Weak independence and the Pareto principle
• A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3845284 (Why is no real title available?)
• A Fourier-theoretic perspective on the Condorcet paradox and Arrow's theorem.
• A quest for fundamental theorems of social choice

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