Social choice theory without Pareto: the pivotal voter approach
From MaRDI portal
Publication:732930
DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003zbMath1193.91050OpenAlexW2075253156MaRDI QIDQ732930
Publication date: 15 October 2009
Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2009.02.003
Related Items
Weak independence and the Pareto principle, A generalization of Campbell and Kelly's trade-off theorem, A note on Murakami's theorems and incomplete social choice without the Pareto principle, Social choice without the Pareto principle: a comprehensive analysis, Brief proofs of Arrovian impossibility theorems
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- A topological approach to Wilson's impossibility theorem
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- The equivalence of strong positive association and strategy-proofness
- Neutrality in arrow and other impossibility theorems
- Arrow's theorem and the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem: A unified approach
- Three brief proofs of Arrow's impossibility theorem
- An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions
- Social welfare functions that satisfy Pareto, anonymity, and neutrality, but not independence of irrelevant alternatives
- Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- t or 1 - t. That is the Trade-Off
- Another direct proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem
