Optimizing positional scoring rules for rank aggregation

DOI10.1016/j.artint.2018.11.001zbMath1484.91167arXiv1609.07460OpenAlexW2963433558WikidataQ128949442 ScholiaQ128949442MaRDI QIDQ2321258

Ioannis Caragiannis, George A. Krimpas, Xenophon Chatzigeorgiou, Alexandros A. Voudouris

Publication date: 28 August 2019

Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1609.07460

zbMATH Keywords

approximation algorithmscomputational social choicepreference learningpositional scoring voting rules

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Computational methods for problems pertaining to game theory, economics, and finance (91-08) Social choice (91B14)

Related Items (1)

Distributed monitoring of election winners

Uses Software

• PrefLib

Cites Work

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• NON-NULL RANKING MODELS. I
• Simple, Robust and Optimal Ranking from Pairwise Comparisons
• Introduction to the Theory of Voting
• Rationalizations of Voting Rules
• Incomplete Information and Communication in Voting
• Voting with Limited Information and Many Alternatives
• Handbook of Computational Social Choice
• Some optimal inapproximability results
• Lower Bounds for Approximation by Nonlinear Manifolds

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