Manipulation of k-approval under de re knowledge

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_12MaRDI QIDQ5057962zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Valeriia Kuka, Egor Ianovski

Publication date 1 December 2022

Published in Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_12

zbMATH Keywords

strategic votingvoting theorychoice

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Voting theory (91B12)

Recommendations

• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
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• Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption

Cites work

• Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
• Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
• Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
• Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
• Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions

Cited in

(3)

• Logics in Artificial Intelligence
• Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
• Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting

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