Manipulation of k-approval under de re knowledge
From MaRDI portal
Publication:5057962
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_12zbMATH Open1502.91024OpenAlexW4250444807MaRDI QIDQ5057962FDOQ5057962
Authors: Valeriia Kuka, Egor Ianovski 
Publication date: 1 December 2022
Published in: Trends in Mathematics (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-93616-7_12
Recommendations
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Cognitive hierarchy and voting manipulation in \(k\)-approval voting
- Gibbard-Satterthwaite games for \(k\)-approval voting rules
- Strategic behavior under complete ignorance: approval and Condorcet-type voting rules
- Strategic voting under the plurality rule without the common knowledge assumption
Cites Work
- Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
- Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
- Determining possible and necessary winners given partial orders
- Logics in Artificial Intelligence
- Strategy-proof probabilistic rules for expected utility maximizers
- Manipulation of Schemes that Mix Voting with Chance
- Even-chance lotteries in social choice theory
Cited In (3)
This page was built for publication: Manipulation of \(k\)-approval under de re knowledge
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q5057962)
