Counting combinatorial choice rules

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2006.03.009MaRDI QIDQ876881zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Federico Echenique

Publication date 19 April 2007

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://resolver.caltech.edu/CaltechAUTHORS:20170731-131625843

zbMATH Keywords

choice rulescommunication complexityindependence of irrelevant alternativesmatching marketsrationalizabiltysubstitutability

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Permutations, words, matrices (05A05) Social choice (91B14) Matching models (91B68)

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Cited in

(17)

• Choice functions and extensive operators
• WARP and combinatorial choice
• A college admissions clearinghouse
• Set and revealed preference axioms for multi-valued choice
• Unified versus divided enrollment in school choice: improving student welfare in Chicago
• Efficiency and stability under substitutable priorities with ties
• A solution to matching with preferences over colleagues
• The communication requirements of social choice rules and supporting budget sets
• Resolutions of convex geometries
• On capacity-filling and substitutable choice rules
• Counting Multiple Cyclic Choices Without Adjacencies
• Affinely representable lattices, stable matchings, and choice functions
• Complexity of stability in trading networks
• Revealed VNM-solutions: characterizations
• Non-distributive lattices, stable matchings, and linear optimization
• Market design with deferred acceptance: a recipe for characterizations
• A cumulative offer process for supply chain networks

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