Stability in large markets
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Cites work
- A Fixed-Point Approach to Stable Matchings and Some Applications
- A necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a complete stable matching
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Contract design and stability in many-to-many matching
- Core many-to-one matchings by fixed-point methods
- Credible group stability in many-to-many matching problems
- Existence of Competitive Equilibria in Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Full substitutability
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 48303 (Why is no real title available?)
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3400923 (Why is no real title available?)
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
- Market structure and matching with contracts
- Markets with a Continuum of Traders
- Matching With Complementary Contracts
- On a characterization of stable matchings
- On a lemma of Scarf.
- On the correspondence of contracts to salaries in (many-to-many) matching
- Pairwise stable matching in large economies
- Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
- Stability and venture structures in multilateral matching
- Stable many-to-many matchings with contracts
- Stable matching in large economies
- Stable matching in large markets with occupational choice
- The Lattice Structure of the Set of Stable Matchings with Multiple Partners
- Three remarks on the many-to-many stable matching problem
- Trade and domestic production networks
- Trading networks with frictions
- Understanding preferences: ``demand types, and the existence of equilibrium with indivisibilities
- Values of Large Games II: Oceanic Games
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