A note on estimation of two-sided matching models

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2012.03.012zbMATH Open1253.91132OpenAlexW3124565752MaRDI QIDQ694959FDOQ694959

Authors: Kosuke Uetake, Yasutora Watanabe 

Publication date: 19 December 2012

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2012.03.012

zbMATH Keywords

maximum likelihoodtwo-sided matchingmarriage market

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Identification in matching games
• Cupid's invisible hand: social surplus and identification in matching models
• On a characterization of stable matchings
• The revealed preference theory of stable and extremal stable matchings
• A note on estimation of two-sided matching models

Cited In (2)

• A note on estimation of two-sided matching models
• Structural estimation of pairwise stable networks with nonnegative externality

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