Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions

DOI10.1007/S11229-019-02522-0OpenAlexW3000183324WikidataQ126319603 ScholiaQ126319603MaRDI QIDQ2695403FDOQ2695403

Authors: Christopher J. G. Meacham 

Publication date: 31 March 2023

Published in: Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02522-0

Recommendations

• On preferences with infinitely many subjective states
• The random utility model with an infinite choice space
• Choice overload and asymmetric regret
• Infinite supermodularity and preferences
• Satisficing and stochastic choice
• Infinite-dimensional utility representation theorems
• Expected utility and the Siegel paradox: A generalization
• (Sub) optimality and (non) optimal satisficing in risky decision experiments
• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 956586

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Utility theory (91B16) Philosophy of mathematics (00A30)

Cites Work

• Emergent spacetime and empirical (in)coherence
• What conditional probability could not be
• The Foundations of Causal Decision Theory
• An axiomatic approach to sustainable development
• Stationary Ordinal Utility and Impatience
• Taking stock of infinite value: Pascal's Wager and relative utilities

Cited In (5)

• When too little is as good as nothing at all: rationing a disposable good among satiable people with acceptance thresholds
• Consequentialism in infinite worlds
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Choice overload and asymmetric regret
• Standard decision theory corrected.

This page was built for publication: Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q2695403)