What conditional probability could not be

DOI10.1023/B:SYNT.0000004904.91112.16MaRDI QIDQ1430141zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Alan Hájek

Publication date 27 May 2004

Published in Synthese (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1023/b:synt.0000004904.91112.16

zbMATH Keywords

conditional probabilityratio analysis

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)

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Cited in

(79)

• On background: using two-argument chance
• Sleeping Beauty and shifted Jeffrey conditionalization
• Probabilistic consistency norms and quantificational credences
• Infinite lotteries, large and small sets
• Conditioning using conditional expectations: the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox
• Adjectival vagueness in a Bayesian model of interpretation
• Vague credence
• Declarations of independence
• Generalized conditionalization and the Sleeping Beauty problem. II
• Imprecise probability and chance
• A puzzle about Stalnaker's hypothesis
• Non-Archimedean probability
• The faulty signal problem: counterfactual asymmetries in causal decision theory and rational deliberation
• Counterfactual skepticism and multidimensional semantics
• Basing for the Bayesian
• Aggregation of experts' opinions and conditional consensus opinion by the Steiner point
• Probabilities of counterfactuals and counterfactual probabilities
• The fall of ``Adams' thesis?
• Sleeping beauty should be imprecise
• Regular probability comparisons imply the Banach-Tarski paradox
• On de Finetti's instrumentalist philosophy of probability
• Independence for full conditional probabilities: structure, factorization, non-uniqueness, and Bayesian networks
• Ultralarge lotteries: analyzing the lottery paradox using non-standard analysis
• The reference class problem is your problem too
• On the alleged impossibility of coherence
• On Bradley's preservation condition for conditionals
• A normatively adequate credal reductivism
• Popper functions, uniform distributions and infinite sequences of heads
• Foundations of probability
• Underdetermination of infinitesimal probabilities
• Ramsey and Joyce on deliberation and prediction
• Credence as doxastic tendency
• Too much of a good thing: decision-making in cases with infinitely many utility contributions
• Triviality for restrictor conditionals
• You can't always get what you want some considerations regarding conditional probabilities
• Titelbaum's theory of de se updating and two versions of Sleeping Beauty
• Sets of probability distributions, independence, and convexity
• Rationality and indeterminate probabilities
• Deterministic probability: Neither chance nor credence
• What Are Conditional Probabilities Conditional Upon?
• A Dutch book theorem and converse Dutch book theorem for Kolmogorov conditionalization
• General properties of Bayesian learning as statistical inference determined by conditional expectations
• Rationality & Second‐Order Preferences
• What is Bayesian confirmation for?
• Conditional probabilities
• Triangulating non-Archimedean probability
• On probabilities in biology and physics
• The propensity interpretation of probability: a re-evaluation
• KOLMOGOROV CONDITIONALIZERS CAN BE DUTCH BOOKED (IF AND ONLY IF THEY ARE EVIDENTIALLY UNCERTAIN)
• Some epistemological ramifications of the Borel-Kolmogorov paradox
• New theory about old evidence. A framework for open-minded Bayesianism
• Conditional probability in the light of qualitative belief change
• ACCURACY AND UR-PRIOR CONDITIONALIZATION
• A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part A
• Disbelief as the Dual of Belief
• Logical perspectives on the foundations of probability
• The strength of de Finetti's coherence theorem
• Explication of inductive probability
• On the imprecision of full conditional probabilities
• Non-classical probabilities invariant under symmetries
• The maxim of probabilism, with special regard to Reichenbach
• A classical way forward for the regularity and normalization problems
• Contra counterfactism
• TOWARDS THE INEVITABILITY OF NON-CLASSICAL PROBABILITY
• Tournament decision theory
• A logical consequence informed by probability
• Probabilities of conditionals: updating Adams
• Bayesianism for non-ideal agents
• Ramsey's conditionals
• Iterated probability revision and the limitations of dyadic probability
• General triviality for counterfactuals
• Non-factive Kolmogorov conditionalization
• The Borel-Kolmogorov paradox is your paradox too: a puzzle for conditional physical probability
• Conditional degree of belief and Bayesian inference
• Higher-order evidence and the dynamics of self-location: an accuracy-based argument for calibrationism
• The impossibility of generating comparative probabilities from primitive conditional probabilities
• Not staying regular?
• Fifteen arguments against hypothetical frequentism
• Revising probabilities and full beliefs

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