Counterfactual skepticism and multidimensional semantics
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Publication:1990930
DOI10.1007/S10670-017-9918-YzbMATH Open1398.03037OpenAlexW2736204592MaRDI QIDQ1990930FDOQ1990930
Authors: H. Orri Stefánsson
Publication date: 26 October 2018
Published in: Erkenntnis (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://philarchive.org/rec/STECSA-22
Recommendations
Probability and inductive logic (03B48) Philosophical and critical aspects of logic and foundations (03A05) Axioms; other general questions in probability (60A05)
Cites Work
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- On the Pragmatics of Counterfactuals
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- Elusive counterfactuals
- A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part A
- A PROBABILISTIC SEMANTICS FOR COUNTERFACTUALS. PART B
- Humean supervenience and multidimensional semantics
- An argument for conjunction conditionalization
Cited In (23)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- COUNTERFACTUALS AND PROPOSITIONAL CONTINGENTISM
- Counterfactual scepticism and antecedent-contextualism
- Levelling counterfactual scepticism
- The non-maximality-solution to counterfactual scepticism
- Modal knowledge and counterfactual knowledge
- Essentialist blindness would not preclude counterfactual knowledge
- On the substitution of identicals in counterfactual reasoning
- Stuck in the closet: a reply to Ahmed
- A probabilistic semantics for counterfactuals. Part A
- Elusive counterfactuals
- Contra counterfactism
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Title not available (Why is that?)
- Towards a new theory of historical counterfactuals
- Humean supervenience and multidimensional semantics
- Counterfactual epistemic scenarios
- Epistemic semantics for counterfactuals
- Philosophical proofs against common sense
- Can counterfactuals really be about possible worlds?
- No fact of the middle
- Assertions of counterfactuals and epistemic irresponsibility
- Ya shouldn'ta couldn'ta wouldn'ta
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