Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
From MaRDI portal
Publication:899160
DOI10.1016/j.artint.2015.05.012zbMath1346.68157arXiv1405.2484OpenAlexW4229718065MaRDI QIDQ899160
Alessandro Lazaric, Nicola Gatti, Marco Rocco, Francesco Trovò
Publication date: 21 December 2015
Published in: Artificial Intelligence (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1405.2484
Learning and adaptive systems in artificial intelligence (68T05) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)
Related Items (7)
Online joint bid/daily budget optimization of Internet advertising campaigns ⋮ Optimal selling mechanisms with crossholdings ⋮ A quality assuring, cost optimal multi-armed bandit mechanism for expertsourcing ⋮ An optimal bidimensional multi-armed bandit auction for multi-unit procurement ⋮ A Differential Privacy Mechanism that Accounts for Network Effects for Crowdsourcing Systems ⋮ Towards better models of externalities in sponsored search auctions ⋮ Truthful Mechanisms with Implicit Payment Computation
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Unnamed Item
- Maintaining equilibria during exploration in sponsored search auctions
- Game theoretic problems in network economics and mechanism design solutions
- Efficient crowdsourcing of unknown experts using bounded multi-armed bandits
- Adaptive Incentive-Compatible Sponsored Search Auction
- Optimal Auction Design
- Probability Inequalities for Sums of Bounded Random Variables
- Regret Analysis of Stochastic and Nonstochastic Multi-armed Bandit Problems
- An incentive-compatible multi-armed bandit mechanism
- Algorithmic Game Theory
- Some aspects of the sequential design of experiments
- Finite-time analysis of the multiarmed bandit problem
This page was built for publication: Truthful learning mechanisms for multi-slot sponsored search auctions with externalities
