Strategy-proof allocation of objects: a characterization result
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Cites work
- scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3650233 (Why is no real title available?)
- An equity characterization of second price auctions when preferences may not be quasilinear
- Coalitional strategy-proofness and fairness
- Fair Allocation of Indivisible Goods and Criteria of Justice
- Fair and group strategy-proof good allocation with money
- Job matching with heterogeneous firms and workers
- Non-manipulable assignment of individuals to positions revisited
- On the incentive properties of multi-item auctions.
- Second price auctions on general preference domains: two characterizations
- Strategy-proofness and efficiency with non-quasi-linear preferences: a characterization of minimum price Walrasian rule
- The Strategy Structure of Two-Sided Matching Markets
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