Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.05.002MaRDI QIDQ2294355zbMATH OpenOpenAlexWikidataFDO

Authors Franklyn Wang, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers

Publication date 10 February 2020

Published in Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.002

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic programmingmatchingreserves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• A dynamic school choice model
• Constrained school choice
• The cost of strategy-proofness in school choice
• School Choice with Consent^*

Cites work

• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives

Cited in

(6)

• Optimum allocation of places to students in a national university system
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
• A dynamic school choice model
• Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
• Dynamic placement in refugee resettlement
• Dynamic reserves in matching markets

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