High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
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Publication:2218558
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Cites work
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- Constrained school choice
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- School choice: an experimental study
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
Cited in
(5)- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
- A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
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