High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
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Publication:2218558
DOI10.1007/S10058-020-00237-0zbMATH Open1455.91166OpenAlexW3087106736MaRDI QIDQ2218558FDOQ2218558
Authors: Tong Wang, Congyi Zhou 
Publication date: 15 January 2021
Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00237-0
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Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
- A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
- Constrained school choice
- School choice: an experimental study
- Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- The instability of matching with overconfident agents
- Demand analysis using strategic reports: an application to a school choice mechanism
Cited In (5)
- School choice in Guangzhou: why high-scoring students are protected?
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- Purchasing seats in school choice and inequality
- A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform
- Preference submission timing and college admission outcomes: evidence from Turkey
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