High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis

DOI10.1007/s10058-020-00237-0zbMath1455.91166OpenAlexW3087106736MaRDI QIDQ2218558

Tong Wang, Congyi Zhou

Publication date: 15 January 2021

Published in: Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-020-00237-0

zbMATH Keywords

manipulationdeferred acceptance mechanism

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (1)

A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform

Cites Work

• Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
• Boston versus deferred acceptance in an interim setting: an experimental investigation
• Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
• Constrained school choice
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• The instability of matching with overconfident agents
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• School choice: an experimental study
• Demand Analysis Using Strategic Reports: An Application to a School Choice Mechanism
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage

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