A quantitative analysis of Turkish public school admission reform

DOI10.1007/S10058-022-00288-5MaRDI QIDQ6156329zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Muharrem Yeşilırmak

Publication date 13 June 2023

Published in Review of Economic Design (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://doi.org/10.1007/s10058-022-00288-5

zbMATH Keywords

majority votingassortative matchingstudent achievement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12) Matching models (91B68)

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Cites work

• scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3393603 (Why is no real title available?)
• High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis

Cited in

(5)

• Teacher labor markets, school vouchers, and student cognitive achievement: evidence from Chile
• Decreasing average cost in private schools, existence of majority voting equilibrium, and a policy analysis for Turkey
• High school admission reform in China: a welfare analysis
• The effect of the demand for elite schools on stratification
• Competition in public school districts: charter school entry, student sorting, and school input determination

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