The medium-run efficiency consequences of unfair school matching: evidence from Chinese college admissions
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Cites work
- Ability sorting and the returns to college major
- College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
- Complementarity and aggregate implications of assortative matching: a nonparametric analysis
- Constrained school choice
- Ex-ante fairness in the Boston and serial dictatorship mechanisms under pre-exam and post-exam preference submission
- Instrumental Variable Treatment of Nonclassical Measurement Error Models
- Manipulation of the running variable in the regression discontinuity design: a density test
- Matching inequality and strategic behavior under the Boston mechanism: evidence from China's college admissions
- On two competing mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
- Regression discontinuity designs with unknown discontinuity points: testing and estimation
- School choice and information: An experimental study on matching mechanisms
- School choice: an experimental study
- Understanding estimators of treatment effects in regression discontinuity designs
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