Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.002MaRDI QIDQ6494262zbMATH OpenFDO

Authors Ran Shorrer, Sándor Sóvágó

Publication date 30 April 2024

Published in Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

zbMATH Keywords

dominated strategiesmarket designschool choicecollege admissionspreference misrepresentation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Recommendations

• College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
• College admissions with affirmative action
• Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
• The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
• College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion

Cites work

• Attention variation and welfare: theory and evidence from a tax salience experiment
• Cognitive ability and games of school choice
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
• Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
• Self-selection in school choice
• Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match

Cited in

(1)

• School choice with independent versus consolidated districts

This page was built for publication: Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6494262)