Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
From MaRDI portal
Publication:6494262
DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2024.01.002MaRDI QIDQ6494262FDOQ6494262
Authors: Ran Shorrer, Sándor Sóvágó 
Publication date: 30 April 2024
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Recommendations
- College choice, selection, and allocation mechanisms: a structural empirical analysis
- College admissions with affirmative action
- Chinese college admissions and school choice reforms: an experimental study
- The iterative deferred acceptance mechanism
- College assignment problems under constrained choice, private preferences, and risk aversion
Cites Work
- College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
- Matching mechanisms and matching quality: evidence from a top university in China
- Dynamic reserves in matching markets
- Suboptimal behavior in strategy-proof mechanisms: evidence from the residency match
- Self-selection in school choice
- Attention variation and welfare: theory and evidence from a tax salience experiment
- Cognitive ability and games of school choice
- Loss aversion in strategy-proof school-choice mechanisms
Cited In (1)
This page was built for publication: Dominated choices under deferred acceptance mechanism: the effect of admission selectivity
Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q6494262)
