Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations

DOI10.3982/ECTA17788zbMath1517.91008OpenAlexW3132302395MaRDI QIDQ6041127

M. Bumin Yenmez, Tayfun Sönmez

Publication date: 26 May 2023

Published in: Econometrica (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3982/ecta17788

zbMATH Keywords

matchingmarket designaffirmative actionhorizontal reservationvertical reservation

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (4)

Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools ⋮ Axiomatic characterizations of the constrained probabilistic serial mechanism ⋮ Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves ⋮ Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints

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