Optimizing reserves in school choice: a dynamic programming approach

DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2019.05.002zbMATH Open1476.91103OpenAlexW2948441059WikidataQ127781035 ScholiaQ127781035MaRDI QIDQ2294355FDOQ2294355

Authors: Franklyn Wang, Ravi Jagadeesan, Scott Duke Kominers 

Publication date: 10 February 2020

Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orl.2019.05.002

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zbMATH Keywords

dynamic programmingmatchingreserves

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic programming (90C39) Matching models (91B68)

Cites Work

• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• Comparative statics in matching markets
• Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
• The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Stability concepts in matching under distributional constraints
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• College admissions with affirmative action

Cited In (6)

• A dynamic school choice model
• Dynamic reserves in matching markets
• Acyclic priority profiles in school choice: characterizations
• Increasing the representation of a targeted type in a reserve system
• Dynamic placement in refugee resettlement
• Optimum allocation of places to students in a national university system

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