Labor market efficiency: output as the measure of welfare

DOI10.1007/S00355-023-01496-WzbMATH Open1537.91143MaRDI QIDQ6549147FDOQ6549147

Authors: Behrang Kamali Shahdadi 

Publication date: 3 June 2024

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15) Matching models (91B68) Labor markets (91B39)

Cites Work

• The assignment game. I: The core
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
• An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
• The allocation of talent and U.S. economic growth
• A search model of two-sided matching under nontransferable utility.
• Title not available (Why is that?)
• Identifying equilibrium models of labor market sorting
• The Taxation of Superstars*
• The effects of student composition on teachers' effort and students' performance: implications for tracking, school choice, and affirmative action

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