The cost of moral hazard and limited liability in the principal-agent problem

DOI10.1007/978-3-642-17572-5_6zbMATH Open1346.91076OpenAlexW1589579628MaRDI QIDQ3066477FDOQ3066477

Authors: Felipe Balmaceda, Santiago R. Balseiro, José R. Correa, N. E. Stier-Moses 

Publication date: 10 January 2011

Published in: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/143378

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Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Welfare economics (91B15)

Cited In (5)

• Computing optimal contracts in combinatorial agencies
• Bounds on the welfare loss from moral hazard with limited liability
• Informed-principal problem with moral hazard, risk neutrality, and no limited liability
• Moral hazard and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm
• Optimal technology design

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