The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1110.1363zbMATH Open1279.91105OpenAlexW2121029855MaRDI QIDQ2870451FDOQ2870451

Authors: Anil Arya, Brian Mittendorf 

Publication date: 20 January 2014

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://semanticscholar.org/paper/024e424b8ccb30341379e12d54f9502a643207b8

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zbMATH Keywords

aggregationcareer concernsgroup performance measures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cited In (3)

• Inter-organizational purchasing contracts: the effects of multi-agents in a supplying firm
• Career concerns and performance reporting in optimal incentive contracts
• The glittering prizes: career incentives and bureaucrat performance

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