The benefits of aggregate performance metrics in the presence of career concerns

DOI10.1287/MNSC.1110.1363MaRDI QIDQ2870451zbMATH OpenOpenAlexFDO

Authors Anil Arya, Brian Mittendorf

Publication date 20 January 2014

Published in Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL https://semanticscholar.org/paper/024e424b8ccb30341379e12d54f9502a643207b8, http://www.jstor.org/stable/25835789

zbMATH Keywords

aggregationcareer concernsgroup performance measures

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

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