Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

DOI10.1016/S0165-1765(00)00217-2zbMATH Open0953.91012OpenAlexW2251050586WikidataQ57443309 ScholiaQ57443309MaRDI QIDQ1978734FDOQ1978734

Elmar G. Wolfstetter, Thomas D. Jeitschko

Publication date: 4 June 2000

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-1765(00)00217-2

Recommendations

• Investment decisions under first and second price auctions
• Auctions with dynamic costly information acquisition
• Auctions with flexible information acquisition
• Auctions with costly information acquisition
• Optimal auctions with information acquisition

zbMATH Keywords

auctionsprocurement

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

• Optimal Auction Design
• Asymmetric Auctions
• Cost-Reducing Investment, Optimal Procurement and Implementation by Auctions

This page was built for publication: Auctions when bidders prepare by investing in ideas

Report a bug (only for logged in users!)Click here to report a bug for this page (MaRDI item Q1978734)