Incomplete Information, High-Low Bidding and Public Information in First Price Auctions

DOI10.1287/MNSC.30.12.1490zbMath0551.90056OpenAlexW2121766236MaRDI QIDQ3343767

Tom K. Lee

Publication date: 1984

Published in: Management Science (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.30.12.1490

zbMATH Keywords

incomplete informationgroup decisionspublic informationfirst price auctionsHigh-low biddingnoncooperative game of information acquisition

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90B99)

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A common value auction model with endogeneous entry and information acquisition ⋮ Competition and information acquisition in first price auctions

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